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In the military dimension, the Four-Day War in Nagorno-Karabakh (2–5 April 2016) changed 
little in the conflict zone. It has, however, had a significant impact on the situation in Armenia. 
The country was shocked out of the political malaise that had been the dominant mood in 
the last few years, and the Karabakh question, which used to animate political life in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, once again became a driving force behind developments. In the 
internal dimension, the renewed fighting galvanised the political scene, triggered a rise in na-
tionalist sentiments, mobilised the public and consolidated it around the Karabakh question, 
overshadowing the frustrations caused by the country’s difficult economic situation. In the 
external dimension, the war, which was viewed as Moscow-endorsed Azerbaijani aggression, 
undermined people’s trust in Russia and the Armenian-Russian alliance. It also made it clear 
for Armenians how uncertain the Russian security guarantees were and exacerbated their 
feelings of vulnerability and isolation on the international stage. 
One of the main consequences the events of recent weeks has had is that Armenia has adopt-
ed a more rigid position on the Karabakh conflict; it is now a much more distant prospect that 
a compromise resolution will be reached and the military scenario is more likely to come to pass 
than it was in previous years. The new dynamics of political life in Armenia may be seen as a kind 
of comeback of politics and may, in turn, give new momentum to the country’s internal political 
processes and Armenia’s activities on the international level-in both cases this will be in a nation-
alist spirit. As a result, developments in Armenia in the coming months may be unpredictable and 
may trigger certain geopolitical processes in the Caucasus region and the entire post-Soviet area.
Armenia’s malaise
Only a few months ago, Armenia’s political and 
social situation was dominated by an apathy 
into which the country had slipped as a conse-
quence of domestic developments since the late 
1990s. In 1998 the camp of Armenia’s first pres-
ident Levon Ter-Petrosyan was side-lined and 
the so-called Karabakh clan, a conglomerate 
of several to several dozen oligarchs from Ar-
menia and Nagorno-Karabakh (including many 
former military commanders) came to power 
and seized control of the political scene and key 
sectors of the economy. 
In 2008, after the end of Robert Kocharyan’s 
second term as president (1998–2008), Arme-
nia undertook a failed attempt at challenging 
the oligarchic order. In the wake of the pres-
idential election in which Serzh Sargsyan, the 
ruling camp nominee, competed with Levon 
Ter-Petrosyan, the leader of the Armenian Na-
tional Congress, the opposition staged mass 
demonstrations with hundreds of thousands of 
protesters accusing the government of rigging 
the election. On 1 March the demonstrations 
were violently put down (leaving ten dead and 
hundreds detained). Even though those events 
did not lead to the formation of an authori-
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tarian regime, they cemented the oligarchic 
system. Due to Sargsyan’s skilful political ma-
noeuvring (which included granting some ‘li-
cenced’ opposition access to the parliament1), 
the Republican Party of Armenia, representing 
the oligarchic and bureaucratic establishment, 
strengthened its grip on power and control of 
the political processes in the country (especial-
ly the elections, due to its control of so-called 
administrative resources); this led to political 
stagnation in Armenia2. The numerous oppo-
sition parties (Armenian National Congress, 
Heritage and others) have been weak, lacking 
charismatic leaders and unable to put forward 
an alternative programme and take advan-
tage of the people’s discontent, as evidenced 
by the developments surrounding the protests 
against electricity price increases in the summer 
of 2015 (these protests came to be known as 
Electromaidan)3. The real power struggles have 
not been taking place between the government 
and the opposition, but between the individual 
oligarchic coteries, and have usually been lim-
ited to competition for resources4. The conse-
1 In the 2012 general election, the following parties en-
tered parliament: Republican Party of Armenia (69 seats), 
Prosperous Armenia (12), Dashnaktsutyun (10), Armenian 
National Congress (7), Rule of Law (3) and Heritage (2). 
The international community responded positively to this 
manual-controlled pluralism (however, independent ob-
servers reported large-scale electoral fraud). 
2 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015- 
12-09/constitutional-referendum-armenia-institutional-
isation-oligarchy
3 The opposition tried to take advantage of the protests, 
but it was not welcomed by the demonstrators; http://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-07-01/
protests-armenia-a-manifestation-states-systemic-crisis 
4 For instance, the conflict between Armenia’s richest oli-
garch Gagik Tsarukyan and Serzh Sargsyan; http://www.
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-03-11/end-pol-
itics-armenia
quences of the oligarchic rule included systemic 
corruption and the absence of any internal re-
forms, as the governing elites have been main-
ly interested in maintaining their holdings, to 
which potential reforms could pose risks.
A majority of the people have found themselves 
in a difficult economic situation involving high 
unemployment, poverty, huge income inequal-
ities, etc. Due to this, the level of social frustra-
tion in Armenia has been very high. However, as 
people did not believe that change was possi-
ble and had no confidence in the entire political 
class (meaning both the government and the op-
position), that frustration did not translate into 
political activity but instead caused general ap-
athy and created increased migration pressure5.
In the external dimension, the situation has 
been equally bad. Held hostage to the unre-
solved Karabakh conflict, Armenia has been in 
a geopolitical deadlock: it is in a state of war 
with Azerbaijan, has no relations with Turkey 
and, most importantly, is politically and eco-
nomically dependent on Russia. The latter has 
been the cornerstone of Armenia’s security pol-
icy: the country is a member of the Collective 
Security Treaty Organisation and hosts Russian 
military bases. It has no independent foreign 
policy, as Moscow controls the key sectors of 
Armenia’s economy and has been forcing it to 
participate in the Russian integration projects in 
the post-Soviet area (e.g. in the Eurasian Union, 
which Armenia joined on 1 January 2015), and 
has simultaneously blocked Armenia’s co-oper-
ation with the West (e.g. in 2013 the Kremlin 
forced Yerevan to scrap the plans to sign an as-
sociation agreement with the European Union).
At the same time, despite many critical voices 
coming mainly from the groups advocating 
rapprochement with the West, a majority of 
Armenians, including the governing elite, have 
5 According to official figures, Armenia currently has 
a population of 3 million (compared to 3.4 million in 
1989), however, these figures are probably an over-es-
timation. 2.5-2.8 million is probably a more realistic es-
timate; see for instance. https://ditord.com/2012/02/10/
armenias-de-facto-population-drops-below-3-million/.
Until recently, Armenia’s political and 
social situation was dominated by apa-
thy caused by what had been happening 
in the country since the late 1990s.
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not until recently perceived their country’s in-
ternational situation as dramatic. The military 
alliance with Russia and the common belief in 
Armenia’s strength and the ‘organic’ weakness 
of the Azerbaijani army, based on psychological 
factors (the victory in the 1992-1994 Karabakh 
war) created a sense of security.
The consequences of the four-day war 
for Armenia
The Four-Day War, which broke out overnight 
between 1 and 2 April 2016, came as a shock 
for the Armenians. While exchanges of fire and 
even acts of sabotage on the front line (both 
in Karabakh and in the Armenian province of 
Tavush bordering Azerbaijan) had been a regu-
lar occurrence6, a massive attack from the Azer-
baijani side was absolutely not expected. De-
spite calming communiqués from the Armenian 
side, several days after the Moscow-mediated 
ceasefire (signed on 5 April) Yerevan and Stepa-
nakert both admitted to having lost more than 
a dozen battle positions and that they had had 
to retreat several hundred metres7. The subse-
quent unprecedented dismissals of high-rank-
ing military officers at the Armenian Ministry of 
Defence8 and the large numbers of casualties 
6 According to unconfirmed reports, 27 Armenian sol-
diers and 6 civilians were killed in fighting in 2014, as 
well as 37 Azerbaijani soldiers and 2 civilians (http://ar-
menianweekly.com/2015/02/04/karabagh/); in 2015 the 
casualty numbers were: 42 Armenian soldiers and 5 ci-
vilians, and at least 35 Azerbaijani soldiers (http://arme-
nianweekly.com/2016/01/14/attrition-war-escalates/).
7 According to reports by the ANI Analytic Centre, which 
have not been denied by the Ministry of Defence of 
Armenia, the Armenian side lost seven battle positions in 
southern Karabakh (in the Hadrut Region) and fourteen 
in the north (near Martakert); http://rus.azatutyun.am/
content/article/27734368.html. The Armenian side has 
also admitted to having to retreat some 200 to 300 me-
tres; http://newsarmenia.am/news/nagorno_karabakh/
azerbaydzhan-ne-osvobozhdal-nikakikh-territoriy-prezi-
dent-armenii/
8 The officials dismissed included: General Arshak Kara-
petyan, chief of the Military Intelligence Department of the 
General Staff of Armenia, Alik Mirzabekyan, deputy de-
fence minister and head of the Material and Technical Sup-
plies Department of the Ministry of Defence, and General 
Komitas Muradyan, commander of the Communication 
Troops; http://www.armenianreport.com/pubs/129161/
(a total of 92 people, including 34 recruits and 
4 civilians9; in a country struggling with a de-
mographic crisis this loss of life was felt particu-
larly painfully), provide a further indication that 
the Armenians were unprepared and taken by 
surprise. It is symptomatic that the prevailing 
mood in Armenia after the Four-Day War was 
the exact opposite of the all-national trium-
phalism that reigned in Azerbaijan10.
The Armenians were even more unsettled by the 
stance of Russia, whose behaviour was seen as 
at best merely biased in favour of Baku – a per-
ception shared even by those who had hitherto 
advocated a firmly pro-Russian foreign policy. 
Moscow, Armenia’s ally and the guarantor of 
its security, was reproached for not condemn-
ing Azerbaijan’s aggression and for limiting 
itself to calling on both sides to refrain from 
violence. There was also an outcry in Armenia 
about statements by Russian politicians, includ-
ing by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev who 
spoke about a strategic partnership between 
Russia and Azerbaijan, as well as the ostensi-
bly friendly atmosphere during the Russian 
foreign minister Sergei Lavrov’s talks in Baku 
on 7 April, the silence of the Collective Securi-
ty Treaty Organisation and the cancellation of 
a Eurasian Union prime ministers meeting in 
connection with the escalation of the con-
flict (it had been scheduled to take place on 
8 April in Yerevan). The Armenians also pro-
tested against the Russian deputy prime min-
ster Dmitry Rogozin’s pledge that Russia would 
9 http://news.am/rus/news/322142.html
10 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016- 
04-06/four-day-war-nagorno-karabakh
Russia’s stance has been cause for con-
cern – even those who had hitherto advo-
cated a firmly pro-Russian foreign policy 
determined that its relations with Baku 
were at least friendly.
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continue selling offensive weapons to Azer-
baijan11. Finally, the Armenian side decried the 
so-called Lavrov Plan, purportedly a proposed 
concept to partly solve the Karabakh con-
flict Armenia argued it amounted to betrayal 
by Russia. The plan reportedly provided for 
a withdrawal of Armenian troops from some 
of the occupied territory in Azerbaijan, deploy-
ment of (presumably Russian) peacekeepers 
there and the granting of a temporary status 
to Nagorno-Karabakh. While it had never been 
made public, the Russian side has refrained 
from unambiguously denying the leaks about 
this plan which have appeared in the media, 
and the reaction by Yerevan suggested that 
such proposals may indeed have been made12.
The Four-Day War has not resulted in any signif-
icant change in the two sides’ positions along 
the front line or a change in the circumstances 
defining Armenia’s geopolitical and internal sit-
uation. However, the escalation and the subse-
quent unfavourable diplomatic developments 
regarding Armenia made the country’s people 
and elites realise how difficult their internation-
al situation was and triggered processes which 
might engender such change in the future.
The main consequence of the escalation in April 
has been for Armenia to adopt a tougher stance 
11 http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/rus-
sia-will-continue-selling-weapons-to-azerbaijan-and-ar-
menia---rogozin/565479.html. It has been estimated 
that Azerbaijan purchased around US$ 4 billion worth 
of weapons from Russia in recent years, including tanks, 
cannons and infantry fighting vehicles. In February 
2016, a Russian-Armenian agreement was signed un-
der which Russia granted Armenia a loan of US$ 200 
million for the purchase of weapons; http://rbth.com/
defence/2016/02/19/russia-grants-200-million-loan-to-
armenia-for-purchasing-weapons_569219
12 http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2972354
on the Karabakh question. It has declared any 
further negotiations to be pointless unless 
there are guarantees to prevent Azerbaijan 
from resuming fighting again. It has further-
more stated that a compromise would only be 
possible if it envisaged a full resolution of the 
conflict instead of the phased approach under 
the so-called Madrid rules formulated by the 
OSCE Minsk Group. This change in Armenia’s 
position was also visible in the radical reactions 
of civil society organisations, including even the 
pro-Western NGOs and analysts, who used to 
believe that concessions were necessary but are 
now ruling them out.
As another significant consequence of the 
Four-Day War, the Armenian-Russian alliance 
has been undermined, trust in Moscow eroded 
and the previously widely-held illusions about 
Russia dispelled. Russia has ceased to be com-
monly perceived as the ‘eternal ally’, and start-
ed to be seen as country guided by an imperi-
alist logic to which its interests, alliances and 
international activities are subordinated. The 
change of attitude towards Russia has not been 
a sudden shift caused solely by the Four-Day 
War; it is rather the culmination of a process 
that had been underway in Armenia for sever-
al years, fuelled by such developments as Rus-
sia’s decision to prevent Armenia from signing 
the association agreement with the EU in Sep-
tember 201313, the case of Valery Permyakov 
(a Russian soldier from the Gyumri base, who 
murdered an Armenian family of five in Janu-
ary 2015; Russia’s refusal to hand him over to 
face justice in Armenia led to massive demon-
strations in the city14) and the protests against 
energy price increases in June and July 2015 
where anti-Russian sentiments, initially absent, 
surfaced after the Russian media represented 
the demonstrations as a Western-inspired ‘Ar-
menian Maidan’).
13 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013- 
09-04/armenia-turns-away-eu
14 For more information, see: http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/analyses/2015-01-21/anti-russian-and-an-
ti-government-protests-armenia
The most important effect of the esca-
lation in April has been for Armenia to 
adopt a tougher position on the Karabakh 
question.
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The change of attitudes towards Moscow was 
also visible in official reactions from Armenia: 
the hostile statements concerning Russia made 
by President Sargsyan (who said for instance 
that “there was no place for Russian peace-
keepers in Karabakh”15; the ostensibly chilly 
reception given to Sergei Lavrov in Yerevan 
(21–22 April); and the fact that the government 
tabled a draft parliamentary resolution for-
mulated by the opposition Heritage party on 
recognising the independence of the so-called 
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (parliament did 
not ultimately discuss the draft)16. The Arme-
nian side also deliberately delayed the ratifica-
tion of the agreement on the establishment of 
a Russian-Armenian air defence system, signed 
in December 2015. On 14 April several hundred 
people staged a demonstration in front of the 
Russian embassy in Yerevan in protest against 
Russia selling weapons to Azerbaijan and to 
demand Armenia’s withdrawal from the Eura-
sian Union. Social media and on-line portals in 
Armenia also witnessed a wave of anti-Russian 
articles and comments.
As a result of the Four-Day War, the Armenians 
also came to realise how illusory the guarantees 
of security and solidarity offered by the Rus-
sian-sponsored organisations were (this refers 
in particular to the Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation and the Eurasian Union, of which 
Armenia is a member). The members of these 
organisations either failed to react to the esca-
lation or adopted pro-Azerbaijani positions (for 
15 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-24/
caucasus-war-may-resume-at-any-moment-armenian-
president-says
16 http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/country/view/35741
instance the Kazakh president Nursultan Naz-
arbayev pushed for the Eurasian Union prime 
ministers meeting in Yerevan to be cancelled)17. 
The West showed little commitment to de-esca-
lating the conflict (this includes Germany, which 
holds the OSCE presidency) and this had a similar 
effect. The Armenians suddenly felt threatened 
and isolated on the international stage.
The events of early April and the changed percep-
tions about Armenia’s international situation had 
an impact on internal political processes. In the 
weeks that followed the escalation in April, a gen-
eral political and social consolidation took place 
which resembled the fight for the Karabakh cause 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The opposition 
scaled down its criticism of the government, put-
ting aside political conflicts, and the public re-fo-
cused its attention away from economic problems 
to the struggle over Karabakh. In a move of sym-
bolic significance for this national consolidation, 
an unprecedented meeting was held between 
president Sargsyan and Levon Ter-Petrosyan on 
9 April at Ter-Petrosyan’s initiative. After the 
meeting Ter-Petrosyan called on the Armenians 
to refrain from criticising the government in the 
face of the mounting external threat18. He also 
met with the Karabakh president Bako Sahakyan. 
The leaders of the two branches of the Armeni-
an Apostolic Church (Catholicos Karekin II and 
the Lebanon-based Catholicos Aram I of Cilicia, 
who is highly revered by the Armenian diaspora) 
normally maintain rather frigid relations. In spite 
of this, they paid a joint visit to Stepanakert19.
These developments unfolded amid a huge rise 
17 Kazakhstan’s de facto pro-Azerbaijani policy had pre-
viously been a source of serious concern in Armenia. 
Other examples of similar actions included the pressure 
from Nursultan Nazarbayev, who insisted that the treaty 
on Armenia’s accession to the Customs Union and the 
Eurasian Union should include a provision explicitly ex-
cluding Nagorno-Karabakh from both operations. Asta-
na, which made no secret of the fact that it was acting 
on a request from Azerbaijan, also called for customs 
posts to be introduced between Armenia and Karabakh.
18 https://www.armenianow.com/en/karabakh/2016/04/12/
armenia-levon-ter-petrosyan-sargsyan-meeting-kara-
bakh/659/
19 http://artsakhpress.am/eng/news/42501/amenayn-ha-
yoc-ev-metsi -tann-k i l ik io -katox ikosnery-zhama-
nel-en-arcakh-lusankarner.html
In the weeks that followed the April con-
flict, Armenia experienced a national con-
solidation resembling the mobilisation 
over the Karabakh question in the late 
1980s and the early 1990s.
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in nationalism and radicalism among Armeni-
ans, a mobilisation of the veteran communities 
and an inflow of hundreds of volunteers from 
throughout Armenia to Karabakh. The Armeni-
an diaspora also mobilised, including the new 
emigration which usually shows little activity 
(e.g. demonstrations were held in front of Azer-
baijani and Russian diplomatic missions in the 
United States and Europe, including Poland)20.
Armenia has also seen renewed activity by cer-
tain politicians and communities; this has not 
always been convenient for the government. 
For instance, the camp of the former president 
Robert Kocharyan became active again: the 
former foreign minister Vardan Oskanian an-
nounced the formation of a new political par-
ty named Consolidation; and Samvel Babayan 
the former Karabakh defence minister, popular 
among veterans, who had been in political exile 
in Moscow since 2004, returned to Armenia21. 
In an interview given to a local paper he fiercely 
criticised the current government (lambasting 
the Ministry of Defence for allowing the loss of 
territory to happen), and his supporters organ-
ised a demonstration in Stepanakert, calling for 
a meeting between Babayan and the Karabakh 
president Bako Sahakyan and for Babayan to be 
restored to the position of defence minister.
20 http://news.am/eng/news/321188.html
21 Considered to have close links to Kocharyan, Samvel Ba-
bayan was the commander of the co-called Karabakh 
army in the years 1993-1999 and the minister of defence 
of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in 
the years 1995–1999. In 2000 he was arrested and sen-
tenced to 14 years in prison for organising a (failed) as-
sassination attempt of the then president of Karabakh 
Arkadi Ghukasyan. In 2004 he was pardoned and emi-
grated to Moscow. 
Politics makes a (dangerous) comeback
The geopolitical deadlock in which Armenia 
had found itself and the internal apathy that 
reigned in the country until recently made it 
seem unlikely that the country and its people 
could become a driving force behind develop-
ments in the South Caucasus. The Four-Day 
War, however, has triggered a number of in-
ternal processes that could change this situa-
tion, undermining the paradigm of Armenians’ 
lack of agency and the ‘end of politics’ in that 
country. The sense of being in danger, alone, 
and betrayed by Russia, the rise of nationalist 
sentiments and the widely held conviction that 
the entire nation needs to consolidate around 
the struggle for Karabakh mean that in the 
immediate future Armenia may become the 
stage of dynamic developments and the con-
sequences for the entire region will be difficult 
to predict. 
What the changes in Armenia mean is first 
and foremost that the prospects of a peaceful 
compromise solution to the Karabakh conflict 
are now minimal. On the contrary, the risk of 
a renewed, protracted regular  warfare has 
increased considerably. Given the public sen-
timents currently prevailing in Armenia, if the 
government were to accept a compromise 
on Karabakh (which would inevitably involve 
a withdrawal of Armenian forces from at least 
some of the occupied territories), it would be 
tantamount to inviting internal political tur-
moil. A scenario of this kind might involve not 
only fierce political disputes and thousands of 
people demonstrating in the streets, but also 
attempts at a coup d’état or the nationalist 
communities resorting to terror methods. As 
recently as autumn 2015 Armenia witnessed 
events indicating that such developments could 
indeed be possible – the secret services arrest-
ed a militant group numbering in the dozens 
of the Nork Marash district of Yerevan; it had 
been planning attacks on high-ranking officials 
A surge in nationalist and radical senti-
ments could be observed in Armenia in 
recent weeks.
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including the president in order to obstruct 
the potential deal on Nagorno-Karabakh. The 
group was led by Artur Vardanyan, who had 
gained his combat experience in the civil war 
in Syria where he was a member of a militia de-
fending the Armenian-populated town of Kes-
sab on the Turkish border against the jihadists. 
It also included the former deputy defence 
minister Vahan Shirkhanyan22. In June 2016, 
Jirair Sefilyan, a Lebanon-born Karabakh war 
veteran and noted nationalist activist, was ar-
rested for planning armed attacks along with 
his supporters23.
What makes the above scenario likely is the 
fact that, unlike many other post-Soviet states, 
Armenia has a very empowered civil society 
with strong traditions of civic activity, an ex-
tensive network of non-governmental organi-
sations, and a relatively good level of freedom 
of speech and political freedoms. The long tra-
dition of political violence is also important; 
the public often regards this as acceptable. To 
illustrate this one may mention: the ongoing re-
spected tradition of the fedayi (guerrilla) move-
ments in the 19th century in eastern Turkey and 
in the 20th century in Nagorno-Karabakh; the 
terror activities of the Dashnaktsutyun party 
members against the tsarist government (late 
19th and early 20th century); the attacks on the 
Young Turks activists responsible for the Arme-
nian genocide (1920s), the terror activities of 
the ASALA (Armenian Army of the Liberation of 
22 http://www.azatutyun.am/content/article/27393505.html; 
https://armenpress.am/eng/news/830188/nss-arrested-vah-
an-shirkhanyan-over-armed-gang%E2%80%99s-case.html
23 http://news.am/rus/news/333047.html
Armenia) founded in Lebanon, which organised 
attacks on Turkish diplomats (1970s and 1980s); 
and the attacks in the Moscow metro carried 
out in 1977 by members of the underground 
Armenian nationalist organisation known as 
the National Unity Party24. The newest history 
of Armenia also provides some examples, such 
as the attack on the Armenian parliament on 
27 October 1999, when an armed group of sev-
eral men commanded by Nairi Hunanyan shot 
dead the prime minister Vazgen Sargsyan, the 
parliamentary speaker Karen Demirchyan and 
several ministers and deputies. 
Potential attempts by Moscow to impose a res-
olution of the Karabakh conflict on the Armeni-
ans or – even more likely – a new escalation of 
the conflict by the Azerbaijani side could also 
trigger an uncontrollable outbreak of violence 
in the Caucasus. Should that happen, the sce-
nario of war will be highly probable. Feeling 
trapped and facing a national disaster (that 
is how the Armenians would perceive a with-
drawal from the occupied territories without 
Nagorno-Karabakh obtaining a determined sta-
tus), Yerevan might decide to recognise the in-
dependence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic 
(which would be tantamount to breaking the 
peace process) and take the risk of starting 
a pre-emptive war not just in Nagorno-Kara-
bakh, but also on other fronts (Tavush, Nakh-
ichevan). It might also decide to carry out strikes 
against strategic infrastructure in Azerbaijan, 
such as pipelines, power plants, oil installations 
or the Mingachevir reservoir providing the sup-
ply of water to Baku, and authorise or organise 
sabotage or terror acts abroad.
While highly probable, this dramatic course of 
developments in Armenia in connection with 
the Karabakh conflict is not the only possible 
scenario. Currently three other scenarios seem 
possible:
24 7 people died and 37 were injured in three separate at-
tacks. The KGB detained three members of the group: 
Stepan Zatikyan, Zaven Bagdasaryan and Hakob Stepa-
nyan. They were executed after a secret trial.
The Four-Day War has triggered a num-
ber of internal processes that could un-
dermine the paradigm of Armenians’ lack 
of agency and the ‘end of politics’ in that 
country.
8OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 215
EDITORS: Adam Eberhardt, Krzysztof Strachota  
Anna Łabuszewska, Katarzyna Kazimierska  
TRANSLATION: OSW 
Co-operation: Nicholas Furnival 
DTP: Bohdan Wędrychowski
The views expressed by the authors of the papers do not 
necessarily reflect the opinion of Polish authorities
Centre for Eastern Studies
Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw
phone: +48 | 22 | 525 80 00
e-mail: info@osw.waw.pl
Visit our website: www.osw.waw.pl
• maintaining the status quo: Moscow will in-
effectively try to impose a compromise solution 
on the Armenian side and Azerbaijan will re-
frain from escalating the conflict again; in this 
variant the situation will revert to the pre-war 
status, i.e. there will be only sporadic exchang-
es of fire on the front line, inconclusive negoti-
ations under the aegis of the Minsk Group will 
continue, and Russia will continue to use the 
Karabakh conflict to consolidate its own influ-
ence in the region;
• chaos in the Caucasus: facing pressure from 
Russia or a new escalation of the conflict on 
the part of Azerbaijan, Armenia will start 
a pre-emptive war that will morph into an all-
out armed conflict between Armenia and Azer-
baijan. It will have the same effects as internal 
destabilisation in Armenia in the event of Ye-
revan’s hypothetical acceptance of an imposed 
peace plan, i.e. chaos in the entire Caucasus re-
gion, with consequences that would be difficult 
to predict;
• the ‘Ossetianisation’ of Armenia: the Arme-
nian side will yield to Russian pressure and ac-
cept the imposed peace plan, Armenian troops 
will withdraw from the occupied territories and 
a peacekeeping force will be deployed in the 
conflict zone. Legally it will be under the aegis 
of the OSCE or another international organisa-
tion, but in reality it will be composed of Rus-
sian troops; internal protests in Armenia will 
be ineffective or will be quelled; in that variant 
Armenia would de facto lose sovereignty, once 
again slipping into a political malaise, and em-
igration would reach catastrophic proportions, 
in which case the country would start to resem-
ble South Ossetia, gradually depopulating and 
irrelevant even in regional power games.
Irrespective of which scenario eventually comes 
to pass, it seems that the recent events will have 
one lasting effect – they have undermined the 
paradigm of pro-Russian Armenians. Because of 
the objective geopolitical circumstances, Arme-
nia will formally remain Russia’s ‘outpost’ in the 
Caucasus, but it will be hard to regard it as Rus-
sia’s ally.  This may hinder Russia’s plans to re-in-
tegrate the post-Soviet area under Moscow’s 
banner and force Russia to pay more attention 
to the Armenian factor in its calculations.
The above scenarios do not take into consid-
eration the difficult-to-predict broader external 
context, and especially the internal situation in 
Russia and developments in the Middle East. 
Geopolitical shocks around Armenia cannot be 
ruled out given the fact that global instability 
is generally rising (such as a serious internal cri-
sis in Russia, a sudden destabilisation in Turkey, 
the Middle East conflict spilling over into the 
Caucasus or an internal collapse in Azerbaijan). 
Any one of these could change the current bal-
ance of power in the region, as a result of which 
possible scenarios of developments in the Cau-
casus would have to be drawn up from scratch.
